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ABSTRACT 
The rapid development of Internet of Things (IoT) technology, 
which is an inter connection of networks through an insecure 
public channel i.e. Internet demands for authenticating the 
remote user trying to access the secure network resources. In 
2013, Ankita et al. proposed an improved three factor remote 
user authentication scheme. In this poster we will show that 
Ankita et al scheme is vulnerable to known session specific 
temporary information attack, on successfully performing the 
attack, the adversary can perform all other major cryptographic 
attacks. As a part of our contribution, we will propose an 
improved scheme which is resistance to all major cryptographic 
attacks and overcomes the defects in Ankita et al. scheme. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.4.6, K.6.5 
General Terms 
Security  
Keywords 
Biometric, Authentication, Session Key, Remote User 
Authentication. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Registration Phase 
R1. Ui selects his identity IDi, password PWi and computes 
W=h(PWi||N) and submits his biometrics information Bi at fuzzy 
extractor to get Gen(Bi) = (Ri,Pi), and submits IDi, W to server 
S, through a secure channel, where N is a random number 
generated by Ui. 
R2. After validating IDi, S computes H=h(IDi||X), e = H⊕W. S 
issues a user’s smart card containing information {e, h(), p, g, 
Y} and sends it to Ui through a secure channel. where Y = g
X 
mod p . 
R3. On receiving the smart card, Ui computes L= N⊕Ri and V = 
h(IDi||PWi||N). Ui stores Pi, L, V into the smart card.  
1.2 Login Phase 
Whenever user Ui wants to login to the remote server S, the user 
will perform the following steps.  
L1. Ui inserts his smart card into a card reader and inputs the 
IDi, PWi and personal biometrics Bi on fuzzy extractor to get Ri 
= Rep(Bi,Pi). On validating the Bi, smart card performs the 
following steps. 
L2.  Compute N = L⊕Ri and verify V* = h(IDi,PWi,N) and 
check whether the computed V* equals to received V. if yes, 
S.C computes: H = e⊕h(PWi||N), selects a random number ru 
and then computes : A1=gru mod p, A2 = Yru mod p = (gX)ru 
mod p, NID = IDi⊕A2, Ci = h(IDi||H||A1||A2||T1) and sends the 
login message <NID,A1,Ci,T1> to S, where T1 is the U’s 
current timestamp.  
1.3 Authentication Phase 
After receiving the login request message, the remote server S 
will perform the following steps:  
A1. On receiving the message < NID,A1,Ci,T1> at time T2, S 
verifies T2 - T1 ≤ Δt, where Δt is the valid time delay. If 
verification does not hold, S terminates the session. Otherwise S 
computes A3 = (gru)X mod p and retrieves IDi = NID⊕A3. 
Then, it computes H = h(IDi||X) and verifies Ci = 
h(IDi||H||A1||A3||T1), if Ci equals the received Ci then S proceeds 
further else terminates the session. 
A2. S chooses a random number rs and computes A4 = g
rs  mod 
p, A5 = (gru)rs mod p, Computes S.K = h(IDi||A3||A5||H||T1||T3), 
where T3 is the S current time stamp. S sends <Cs,A4,T3> to Ui 
where Cs = h(IDi||S.K||H||T3). where T3 is the time at which ‘S’ 
sent the login reply message.   
A3. On receiving the login message < Cs,A4,T3> at time T4, 
Smart card  verifies T4-T3 ≤ Δt.  If yes , S.C computes A6 = 
(grs)ru mod p, S.K = h(IDi||A2||A6||H||T1||T3). Finally it verifies, 
Cs
* = h(IDi||S.K||H||T3). S.C verifies the CS
* = CS. If verification 
doesn’t hold, S.C terminates the session. On mutual 
authentication among Ui and server S, all the further 
communication is encrypted with the session key framed.  
2. Cryptanalysis of  Ankita et al Scheme 
To analyze the security of  Ankits et al.’s scheme, we assume 
that an attacker could obtain the secret values stored in the smart 
card of Ui i.e  {ei, h(), p, g, Y, Pi, L,V } by monitoring the power 
consumption [2] and the intercepted messages i.e 
<NID,A1,Ci,T1>, <Cs,A4,T3>  between the user and the server.  
2.1 Known Session Specific Temporary 
Information Attack  
If an adversary ‘E’ gets the session secret value of user Ui. i.e ru 
and biometric information Bi, ‘E’ can perform following steps.  
Step1:  Frame A1=gru mod p, A2 =  Yru mod p. 
Step 2:  ‘E’ can frame IDi = NID⊕A2, from intercepted login 
message <NID,A1,Ci,T1>.  
Step 3: Compute: Rep (Bi,Pi) = Ri
*, N = L⊕Ri
*. Intercept H = 
e⊕W and replace H with e⊕W = e⊕h(PWi||N) in Ci equation. 
i.e Ci = h(IDi||H||A1||A3||T1) 
Step 4: Frame Ci = h(IDi||e⊕h(PWi||N)||A1||A2||T1). In Ci, ‘E’ 
knows all the values of Ui except PWi. Now ‘E’ can perform 
password guessing attack on Ci. Guess the value of PWi to be 
PWi* from uniformly distributed dictionary and check Ci* = 
h(IDi||e⊕h(PWi
*||N)||A1||A2||T1). If both sides are equal, then 
the Ui password is PWi*. Otherwise ‘E’ can repeat the process to 
get correct value PWi*. On getting correct password PWi, ‘E’ 
can frame H = e⊕h(PWi*||N).  
Step 5: Compute A6 = (A4)
ru
 mod p = (g
rs
)
ru
 mod p from 
intercepted message   < Cs, A4,T3>. 
On getting PWi, IDi, N as discussed above,  the adversary can 
frame the session key S.K  = h(IDi||A2||A6||H||T1||T3) and can 
perform all major cryptographic attacks like user impersonation, 
DoS, Masquerade attacks etc. 
3. PROPOSED SCHEME             
3.1 Registration Phase 
R1. Ui selects his identity IDi, password PWi and computes 
W=h(PWi||N||T1) and submits his biometrics information Bi at 
fuzzy extractor to get Gen(Bi) = (Ri,Pi), and submits IDi, W to 
server S at time T1, through a secure channel, where N is a 
random number generated by Ui. 
R2. On receiving the login message at time T2, After validating 
IDi, S computes G=h(IDi||X), H=G⊕T2, e = H ⊕W. S issues a 
user’s smart card containing information {e,  h(), p, g, Y}, 
T1⊕T2 to Ui through a secure channel. where Y = g
X mod p . 
R3. On receiving the smart card, Ui computes L= N ⊕ Ri ⊕T1 
and V = h(IDi||T1||PWi||T2||N). Ui stores Pi, L, V, M= h(IDi⊕ 
T2)⊕T1, N=h(PWi||Ri)⊕T2 into the smart card.  
3.2 Login Phase 
Whenever user Ui wants to login to the remote server S, the user 
will perform the following steps.  
L1. Ui inserts his smart card into a card reader and inputs the 
IDi, PWi and personal biometrics Bi on fuzzy extractor to get Ri 
= Rep(Bi,Pi). On validating the Bi, smart card performs the 
following steps. 
L2. Compute T2 = N⊕h(PWi||Ri), T1= M⊕h(IDi⊕T2), N = 
Ri⊕L⊕T1 and verify V* = h(IDi||T1||PWi||T2||N) and check 
whether the computed V* equals to received V. if yes, S.C 
computes: H = e⊕h(PWi||N||T1). selects a random number ru 
and then compute A1=gru mod p, A11 = A1⊕T2⊕T3, A2 = Yru 
mod p = (gX)ru mod p, A22 = A2⊕T3, NID = 
IDi⊕A22⊕h(T1||T3||T2), Ci = h(IDi||H||A22||A11||T1||T3||T2) 
and sends the login message <NID,A11,Ci,Q=T3⊕h(T1)> to S 
where T3 is the current time of smart card.   
3.3 Authentication Phase 
A1. On receiving the message < NID,A11,Ci,T3⊕h(T1)> at 
time T4, S verifies T4 – T3 ≤ Δt.. if yes,  S computes  Q⊕h(T1) 
= T3. A11⊕T2⊕T3 = A1*, A2* = (A1*)X  mod p, A22* = 
A2*⊕T3, and retrieves IDi = NID ⊕ A22
*⊕ h(T1||T3||T2). 
Then, ‘S’ computes H = h(IDi||X)⊕T2  and verifies Ci* = 
h(IDi||H|| A22*|| A11* || T1||T3||T2), if Ci
* equals the received Ci 
then S proceeds further else terminates the session. 
A2. S chooses a random number rs and computes A4 = g
rs 
 mod 
p, A44 = A4⊕T3⊕T4, A5 = (gru)rs mod p, A55 = A5⊕T3⊕T5. 
Computes S.K = h(IDi||A22*||A55||H||T1 ||T3||T5), where T5 is 
the S current time stamp. S further computes Cs = (IDi|| S.K ||H || 
T2||T4), P=h(T1||IDi||T3)⊕T4, Q=h(T2||IDi||T3)⊕T5,  S sends 
<Cs,A44,P,Q> to Ui at time T5.   
A3. On receiving the login message <Cs,A44,P,Q> S.C 
computes T4 = P⊕h(T1||IDi||T3), T5 = Q⊕h(T2||IDi||T3), 
A44⊕T3⊕T4 = A4, A5* = (A4)ru mod p = (grs)ru mod p, A55* 
= A5* ⊕ T3 ⊕T5, S.K = h(IDi||A22||A55
*||H||T1||T3||T5). Finally 
S.C computes Cs
* = h(IDi||S.K ||H||T2||T4) and verifies whether 
CS
* = CS. If verification doesn’t hold, S.C terminates the 
session. Once the Ui and S are mutually authenticated, all the 
further communication is encrypted with the session key framed. 
 
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF 
PROPOSED SCHEME 
Table 1. Type of users and the values they know 
 
 
Table 2. Cost comparison among various smart card schemes 
 
 
 
In our scheme the legal adversary ‘E’ is assumed to know Bi, ru, 
rs, smart card values of  legal user Ui. Due to no chance of 
getting the values IDi, T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 of Ui, it’s not 
possible for ‘E’ to guess any unknown value of Ui and to 
perform any kind of attack, where as in Ankita et al. scheme 
with Bi, ru value the adversary can come to know the passowrd 
of Ui and can perform all major atatcks. Hence we conclue that 
with negligible increase in computation, communication and 
storage cost we have proposed a robust remote user 
authentication scheme which is resistant to all major attacks.  
5. REFERENCES 
[1] Ankita,C, Dheerendra.,M, Sourav.M, Improved Biometric-
Based Three-factor Remote User Authentication Scheme 
with Key Agreement Using Smart Card. Ninth International 
Conference on Information Systems Security (ICISS 2013), 
16-20 December 2013, ISI Kolkata, India.  
[2] Messerges.T.S, Dabbish,E.A and Sloan.R.H, “Examing 
smartcard security under the threat of power analysis 
attacks,” IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 5, no. 3, 
pp. 514-522, 2002. 
